17. februar 1943

17. februar 1943


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17. februar 1943

Krig til søs

Tysk ubåd U-201 sænket med alle hænder ud for Newfoundland

Tysk ubåd U-205 sænket sig ud for Cyrenaica

Italiensk ubåd Asteria ødelagt efter at være blevet alvorligt beskadiget af de britiske destroyere Easton og Hvedeland.

Nordafrika

Tysk modangreb når Kasserine, Feriana og Sbeitla

Britisk 8. armé fanger Medenine



Amerikansk 168. infanteri ’s sidste stand ved Kasserine Pass

2. bataljon, 16. infanteriregiment i den amerikanske hær marcherer gennem Kasserine Pass og videre til Kasserine og Farriana, Tunesien 26. februar 1943

USA's oprør ved Kasserine Pass skulle fortsætte i flere dage. Selvom den amerikanske hær hurtigt bragte forstærkninger og stivnede linjen, var der mange lommer af mænd, der havde båret hovedtyngden af ​​det første angreb, som ikke var blevet taget til fange.

Oberst Thomas D. Drake fra det 168. infanteri blev overladt til kommandoen over en blandet gruppe på omkring 400 mand. De blev isoleret fra andre amerikanske enheder og forsøgte at komme tilbage til amerikanske linjer ved at gå på tværs af landet. Da de forsøgte at krydse en vej, blev de affyret af en tysk motoriseret søjle, der kom op ad vejen. Det var her, de skulle tage et sidste standpunkt. Oberst Drake skulle engang senere skrive en officiel rapport om mødet for det amerikanske militær. I denne rapport omtaler han sig selv i tredje person, da han beskriver begivenheder den 17. februar:

Fjenden stoppede og begyndte at springe fra deres lastbiler, mens fjendtlige kampvogne straks begyndte at omringe den amerikanske søjle. Et amerikansk fly fløj over på dette tidspunkt og åbnede ild mod søjlen. Vores mænd troede med stigende moral, at det var den lovede luftstøtte, men det var tilsyneladende en ensom natjager, lidt sent ved at komme tilbage fra sin mission.

En tysk lastbil blev påkørt og tændt. Oberst Drake indsatte straks sin blandede kommando og åbnede ild med de våben, de havde. På dette tidspunkt var der omkring 400 mand i kommandoen, og ikke mere end halvdelen af ​​dem var bevæbnet.

Oberst Drake bad om frivillige fra en officer og mænd betjenten til at lede gruppen af ​​mænd til en knude i ryggen, da det tyske infanteri løb for at cirkulere dem. Førsteløjtnant William Rogers, artilleriliafficer for det 91. pansrede artilleri, meldte sig frivilligt til at lede de tolv mænd og opfordrede dem til at følge ham. De fik den ønskede jord, en lille knud i ørkenen, og de var i stand til at holde fjenden af ​​i cirka en time. Ved afslutningen af ​​timen var løjtnant Rogers og alle hans mænd blevet dræbt.

Tyskerne bragte flere tanke op, alle sammen med gule tigre malet på deres sider og åbnede ild. De oprettede også maskingeværpositioner og supplerede det med geværild. Mens de gjorde dette, omringede deres infanteri fuldstændig den lille amerikanske styrke. Efter tre og en halv times kamp faldt den amerikanske brandmagt og ophørte praktisk talt, da mændene var løbet tør for ammunition eller var blevet tilskadekomne. Endelig kom en pansret bil med et hvidt flag styrtende ind i den amerikanske cirkel.

Oberst Drake beordrede sine mænd til at vinke bilen væk. Da bilen ikke reagerede, beordrede han derefter sine mænd til at skyde på den tyske bil. Nogle af mændene begyndte at skyde, men andre kunne ikke –, da de ikke havde ammunition, og derefter begyndte de at overgive sig i små grupper.

Tyske kampvogne kom ind efter det køretøj uden nogen forhandlinger om overgivelse. Tyskerne havde brugt det hvide flag som undertrykkelse for at komme ind i forsvarskredsen uden at trække ild. Deres tanke lukkede ind fra alle retninger og skar oberst Drake ’s styrker i små grupper.

Mændene, der ikke overgav sig, blev dræbt af tyskerne. En tank kom mod oberst Drake, og en tysk betjent, der pegede et gevær mod ham, råbte, “Colonel, du overgiver dig. ” Obersten svarede, “ Du går til helvede, ” og vendte ryggen til. Han gik derefter væk, og to tyske soldater med rifler fulgte ham i en afstand af omkring halvtreds meter. Oberst Drake blev derefter stoppet af en tysk major, der talte godt engelsk og blev bedt om at sætte sig i den tyske major ’s bil, hvor han blev ført til Germand Divisions hovedkvarter.

Oberst Drake blev ført til general Schmidt, gruppechef for den 10. og 21. panserdivision ved det tyske divisions hovedkvarter, hvor den tyske general straks stod frem for at se ham, trak op med opmærksomhed, hilste og sagde, “Jeg vil komplimentere din kommando for den prægtige kamp, ​​de stillede. Det var en håbløs ting fra starten, men de kæmpede som rigtige soldater. ”

Den tyske kommandør lovede oberst Drake, at alle de amerikanske sårede ville blive passet, og at han kunne forlade amerikansk medicinsk personale for at passe dem ordentligt, men umiddelbart efter at oberst Drake forlod feltet, blev det amerikanske lægepersonale ført ud som fanger og amerikaneren døde og sårede overladt til arabernes hærgen, der fortsatte med at fjerne døde og sårede og slå ufølelige de sårede, der protesterede mod afklædning af deres tøj.

De amerikanske fanger var samlet i en gruppe og under bevogtning marcherede tilbage gennem eftermiddagen og natten langs vejen til DJ ,. LESSOUDA. De amerikanere, der blev lettere såret, eller som blev syge på grund af træthed, mangel på mad og vand og ikke kunne følge med søjlen, blev hensynsløst bajonetteret eller skudt. Mange gik barfodet, fordi araberne havde taget deres sko fra dem under tilsyn af de tyske soldater.

Krigsfanger

Mændene havde været overladt til det systematiske røveri af de tyske soldater og nogle juniorofficerer i en periode på cirka en halv time. I løbet af denne tid blev lommer og kits grundigt gennemsøgt, ofte på det sted, hvor geværet eller bajonetten blev præsenteret ved den ubeskyttede mave, ure, ringe, lommebøger, kuglepenne og alle værdigenstande blev hensynsløst beslaglagt. De bar derefter dannet i en firkolonne, betjente i spidsen, og begyndte bagud. Tre tyske kampvogne bragte bagsiden af ​​søjlen op, som blev flankeret af bevæbnede vagter, der ventede på at slå til, bajonet eller skyde, enhver som af en eller anden grund strøg.

Hele dagen marcherede de gennem ørkensand med uforløst tørst næsten uudholdelig. Oberst Drake appellerede til den tyske chef i den fælles menneskelighedens navn om at give mændene en drink vand, men blev mødt med erklæringen, “Vi har kun nok til vores tropper. ” Tæt på midnat blev de endelig standset for resterende timer med mørke. Mændene blev samlet i en cirkel i den åbne ørken, og der frøs praktisk talt i den gennemtrængende kulde i Aftican night.

THOMAS D. DRAKE, 015364 Oberst, G.S.C., WDGS (Tidligere kommanderende 168. inf)

Endnu et syn på terrænet i området. En Medium Tank M3 “Lee ” fra den amerikanske 1. pansrede division under slaget ved Kasserine Pass, Tunesien.


WW II B-17 Survival Story – Stort set halveret af et midtluftskollision med en tysk jager, det fik besætningen hjem!

Den 1. februar 1943 var der en kollision i luften mellem et B-17 bombefly og et tysk jagerfly over Tunis dock-område i Tunesien, Nordafrika. Billederne af den beskadigede bombefly blev nogle af de mest legendariske fotografier fra Anden Verdenskrig.

Det begynder, da en fjendtlig jagerfly, der angreb dannelsen af ​​den 97. bombeflygruppe, der formodentlig havde en skadet pilot, var ved at dreje ud af kontrol og styrtede ind bag på flykroppen på et B-17 Flying Fortress-bombefly, der blev kaldt 'All American . ’ B-17 blev piloteret af Lt. Kendrick R. Bragg, fra den 414. bombe-eskadron. Det tyske kampfly brød fra hinanden, da det ramte fæstningen, men efterlod nogle stykker i bombeflyet.

Den venstre elevator og den venstre vandrette stabilisator på B-17 blev helt flået af. Radioerne, iltsystemet og det elektriske system blev alle alvorligt beskadiget. Den lodrette stabilisator og roret var hærget. Flykroppen var blevet splittet næsten fuldstændig gennem fastgjort med kun to små dele af rammen, og snittet i hovedkroppen gik hele vejen til den øverste kanonens skydestilling.

Begge styrbords motorer var ude, og den ene motor på babord side havde en alvorlig lækage i oliepumpen, og der var også et hul i toppen af ​​bombeflyet, der var over 4 fod bredt på det bredeste sted og 16 fod langt .

Halesektionen vaklede og sprang faktisk under flyvning og snoede sig, når flyet drejede. Alle styrekabler blev løsrevet, undtagen et enkelt elevatorkabel, der stadig fungerede. Mirakuløst nok fløj den flyvende fæstning stadig!

Der var ikke noget gulv, der forbandt halesektionen med resten af ​​flyet, derfor var bombeflyets haleskytter fanget. Midtsektionskanalerne og halesektionsskytterne brugte nogle af de dele af den tyske jagerfly, der var indlogeret i B-17 og deres egne faldskærmsbøjler, der forsøgte at forhindre halen i at rive af og forsøge at holde sammen de to sider af flykroppen.

Da besætningen arbejdede febrilsk for at forhindre bombeflyet i at rive fra hinanden, fortsatte piloten mod sit mål og udgav med succes sine bomber.

Da piloten åbnede bombardørdørene, var ustabiliteten i B-17 og vindturbulensen så stor, at den drev en af ​​midtsektionskanalerne ind i den ødelagte halesektion. Det tog fire besætningsmedlemmer flere minutter at passere ham ledningen fra faldskærmene og trække ham tilbage i den forreste del af flyet.

De tænkte på at gøre det samme for haleskytten, men de tog ikke højde for, at skytten gav en stabil vægt til halesektionen, så han gik tilbage, da halen begyndte at bryde af.

Efter bombeafslutningen var toget hjem til England nødt til at være meget langsomt og omhyggeligt, så halen ikke ville flå af. Turen til hjemmet i den hærgede B-17 dækkede faktisk næsten 70 miles.

Den flyvende fæstning blev så alvorligt beskadiget, at højden langsomt faldt, den mistede hastighed og fløj hurtigt alene på himlen. På vejen hjem havde B-17 et kort møde med yderligere to ME-109 Luftwaffe-krigere.

Maskinskytterne var i stand til at afvise disse overfald trods den omfattende skade og kørte hurtigt krigerne af sted. De to midtskydende kanoner måtte stå med hovedet stikker ud gennem hullet i toppen af ​​bombeflyets hovedafdeling for at skyde deres maskingeværer.

Haleskytten befandt sig i en mærkelig knibe, da han skød rekylen fra pistolen fik flyet til at dreje, så han besluttede, at han kunne skyde i korte bursts.

P-51-krigere, der tog flyvning fra England, indhentede 'All American' Flying Fortress, da den krydsede Den Engelske Kanal og tog et af de billeder, der øjeblikkeligt blev berømt. De kontaktede basens hovedkvarter og fortalte, at halesamlingen vinkede som en fiskehale, og at flyet ikke ville nå at lande.

Piloterne foreslog, at der skulle sendes både for at redde besætningen, da de redde ud. Lt. Bragg videresendte meddelelser til P-51-piloterne med håndsignaler, da de fløj sammen med B-17, og piloterne sendte igen beskederne videre til basiskommandoen.

Lt. Bragg meddelte, at alle faldskærmene var blevet brugt til at reparere dele af flyet, så besætningen var ude af stand til at redde ud. Han fortalte piloterne, at da de ikke kunne redde ham, ville han blive hos bombeflyet og lande det.

Den flyvende fæstning gjorde sin sidste drejning til landingsbanen to og en halv time efter at være blevet næsten ødelagt, mens den stadig var over 40 miles væk. Det styrtdykkede i en nødsituation og en opadrettet mave landing.

Ambulancen blev vinket ud, da den trak ved siden af, fordi ikke et medlem af besætningen var kommet til skade. Det var utroligt, at B-17 stadig var i stand til at flyve i sådan en tilstand af forfald.

Fæstningen sad stille og roligt på landingsbanen, indtil hvert besætningsmedlem steg af flyet gennem hullet i flykroppen, og haleskytten var faldet ned af en stige, på hvilket tidspunkt hele den bageste del af flyet krøllede til jorden. Den barske gamle fugl havde afsluttet sin mission.

B-17 “Alt amerikansk ” (414. eskadrille, 97BG) Besætning
Pilot- Ken Bragg Jr.
Copilot- G. Boyd Jr.
Navigator- Harry C. Nuessle
Bombardier- Ralph Burbridge
Ingeniør- Joe C. James
Radiooperatør- Paul A. Galloway
Ball Turret Gunner- Elton Conda
Talje Gunner- Michael Zuk
Tail Gunner- Sam T. Sarpolus
Ground Crew Chief- Hank Hyland

Video

Fra dagbogen for oberstløjtnant Kermit D. Wooldridge, 525. bombe eskadron, 379. bombe gruppe, 8. luftvåben. Den fine grænse mellem liv og død er beskrevet med hans egne ord fra en dagbogspost dateret 17. juli 1943.


Borger Daily Herald (Borger, Tex.), Bind. 17, nr. 77, red. 1 søndag den 21. februar 1943

Dagblad fra Borger, Texas, der indeholder lokale, statslige og nationale nyheder sammen med omfattende reklame.

Fysisk beskrivelse

otte sider: ill. side 22 x 18 tommer. Digitaliseret fra 35 mm. mikrofilm.

Oprettelsesoplysninger

Sammenhæng

Det her avis er en del af samlingen med titlen: Texas Digital Newspaper Program og blev leveret af Hutchinson County Library, Borger Branch til The Portal to Texas History, et digitalt arkiv, der er vært for UNT Libraries. Det er blevet set 22 gange. Flere oplysninger om dette problem kan ses nedenfor.

Mennesker og organisationer, der er forbundet med enten oprettelsen af ​​denne avis eller dens indhold.

Redaktør

Forlægger

Publikum

Tjek vores websted for ressourcer til undervisere! Vi har identificeret dette avis som en primære kilde i vores samlinger. Forskere, pædagoger og studerende kan finde dette problem nyttigt i deres arbejde.

Leveret af

Hutchinson County Library, Borger Branch

Hutchinson County Library bestræber sig på at levere tjenester på et fair og rimeligt grundlag til alle individer og grupper i samfundet. Det sigter mod at være en kilde til livslang læring for at hjælpe med at imødekomme behovet for information og svar på generelle spørgsmål fra alle samfundslag. Det indeholder også Hutchinson County Genealogical Society.


Detroit Race Riot fra 1943

Den 20. juni 1943 udbrød der en kamp mellem afroamerikanske og hvide Detroiters, der tilbragte deres søndag på Belle Isle, byens store park midt i Detroit -floden. Kampene spredte sig til fastlandet, og rygter krydsede byen, der vækkede racespændinger, der havde været ved at løbe højt og truede med at koge over i vold i flere måneder. Optøjer spredte sig, med lidt forsøg fra politiet på at stoppe det (faktisk tyder meget på, at mange hvide politier letter og endda deltager i vold mod afroamerikanere), og da præsident Franklin Roosevelt sendte føderale tropper om aftenen i juni 21, hundredvis var blevet såret, og 34 mennesker var døde: 25 afroamerikanere (hvoraf 17 blev skudt af politiet) og 9 hvide. Af de anholdelser, der blev foretaget senere, var 85% afroamerikanere.

Mange faktorer bidrog til den spænding, der endelig blev frigivet under Race Riots i 1943. Med Amerikas indtræden i Anden Verdenskrig blev Detroits autofabrikker omdannet til fremstillingsmateriale til krigsindsatsen. Som et resultat oplevede Detroit en stor befolkningstilstrømning af mennesker fra hele landet for at fylde de job, der blev skabt af krigens efterspørgsel. Mellem 1940 og 1943 steg Detroits befolkning med omkring 500.000 - omtrent en tredjedel af dens tidligere befolkning. Mange af de tilflyttere var hvide sydboere, der ofte bragte en tradition for forskelsbehandling af afroamerikanere med sig. Sorte flokkedes også til byen, og ofte var der konkurrence om job.

Arbejdsstop relateret til afroamerikansk fremgang.

På samme tid blev United Auto Workers (UAW) ved at få damp i sine bestræbelser på at organisere fabriksarbejderne. UAW støttede racemæssig lighed og gik ind for medlemmer af alle racer. På trods af denne støtte kaldte vrede hvide arbejdere ofte strejker, når sorte arbejdere tjente forfremmelser. Disse walkouts over afroamerikansk fremgang bidrog til racespændingen i byen.

Boliger præsenterede et andet problem. I årevis havde sorte for det meste været isoleret i et par kvarterer i byen, såsom Black Bottom og Paradise Valley. Boligerne i disse slumkvarterer var afgrundsdybe og ekstremt overfyldte. Især da befolkningen voksede, havde folk brug for flere og mere passende boliger. I 1941 besluttede den føderale regering at bygge et boligprojekt i det nordvestlige Detroit for afroamerikanske forsvarsarbejdere, kaldet Sojourner Truth Housing Project. Agitation fra det hvide samfund overbeviste regeringen om at ændre projektet til i stedet at rumme hvide lejere. Denne omskiftning fremkaldte et ramaskrig ikke kun fra borgerrettighedsforkæmpere og det afroamerikanske samfund, men også fra borgmester Edward Jeffries. Regeringen vendte igen sin beslutning tilbage og afleverede projektet tilbage til sorte lejere. Da indflytningsdagen kom i slutningen af ​​februar 1942, udsatte hvide skarer de afroamerikanske familier for chikane og vold. Til sidst blev sikkerhedsstyrker indsat i april for at skræmme de hvide provokatører, og endelig begyndte afroamerikanske familier at besætte boligprojektet. Mange ser denne hændelse som en forløber for optøjer i 1943.

UAW og andre, der kæmper for racemæssig ligestilling, opfordrede ofte patriotisme som et samlingspunkt. Det blev ofte beklaget, at sådan racemæssig fjendskab kun brænder aksemagterne op, som derefter kan konstatere, at de allierede ikke er mere tolerante end de. Ydermere blev spørgsmål, der blev præsenteret ved mangel på bolig og optøjerne selv ofte kvantificeret i antallet af arbejdstimer, der gik tabt af krigsindsatsen.

Mens andre faktorer som politisk korruption, mangel på afroamerikansk repræsentation i politistyrken, mangel på passende rekreationsfaciliteter og racistiske agitatorer bidrog til optøjer i 1943, spillede konkurrence om job og boliger de største roller. I slutningen af ​​1943 udpegede borgmester Jeffries som svar på urolighederne Interracial Committee til at komme med anbefalinger, der er designet til at forbedre statslige tjenester, der påvirker raceforhold, til at undersøge og håndtere situationer med diskrimination og racespændinger og til at udarbejde informationsprogrammer for at øge den gensidige forståelse inden for fællesskab.

De, der er interesseret i at undersøge race -optøjer i Detroit i 1943, kan finde mange ressourcer på Reuther -biblioteket. Fotos fra begivenheden og dens eftervirkninger kan ses i vores billedgalleri, og en oversigt kan findes i vores lodrette fil. Lewis B. Larkin Papers, NAACP Detroit Branch Records og Detroit Commission on Community Relations (DCCR)/Human Rights Department Records - som udviklede sig fra Interracial Committee - giver alle indsigt i optøjerne i 1943. Charles A. Hill Papers tilbyder oplysninger om Sojourner Truth Housing Project fra 1942.

Johanna Russ var arkivar for den amerikanske sammenslutning af stats-, amts- og kommunalt ansatte (AFSCME) fra 2008 til 2013.


17. februar 1943 - Historie

Vores redaktører gennemgår, hvad du har indsendt, og afgør, om artiklen skal revideres.

B-17, også kaldet Flyvende fæstning, Amerikansk tung bombefly brugt under anden verdenskrig. B-17 blev designet af Boeing Aircraft Company som svar på en specifikation fra Army Air Corps fra 1934, der krævede et firemotorigt bombefly på et tidspunkt, hvor to motorer var normen.

Bomberen var fra begyndelsen beregnet til at angribe strategiske mål ved præcis dagslysbomber, der trængte dybt ind i fjendens territorium ved at flyve over det effektive område af luftskytsartilleri. Turboladede radialmotorer (en unik amerikansk udvikling) skulle give den nødvendige ydeevne i stor højde, og tung defensiv bevæbning skulle give beskyttelse mod angribende krigere. Nøjagtighed skulle opnås med Norden -bombesynet, udviklet og aflagt i stor hemmelighed i løbet af 1930'erne. Norden bestod af et gyroskopisk stabiliseret teleskopisk syn koblet til en elektromekanisk computer, som bombardøren førte input til højde, atmosfæriske forhold, lufthastighed, grundhastighed og drift. Under bombeløbet blev synet slavet til den automatiske pilot for at lede flyet til det præcise frigivelsespunkt. I hænderne på en dygtig bombardør var Norden et bemærkelsesværdigt præcist syn.

Den første prototype bombefly fløj i midten af ​​1935, og B-17 gik i produktion i mindre skala i 1937. Tidlige versioner viste sig at være mere sårbare over for jagerangreb end forventet, men da B-17E-versionen begyndte at gå ind service kort før USA gik ind i krigen i 1941, var flyet udstyret med tårne ​​i den øvre skrog, mave og hale. Alle undtagen det sidste tårn var strømdrevne, og hver monterede et par maskingeværer på 0,50 kaliber (12,7 mm). Denne øgede ildkraft gjorde B-17 til en formidabel modstander for fjendtlige krigere, især når man flyver i tæt stablede defensive formationer for gensidig beskyttelse. Grundelementet i en typisk formation var en eskadrille "kasse" med 9 eller 12 fly. Tre eskadrillekasser forskudt lodret og vandret dannede en gruppe, og tre grupper på sporet dannede en kampfløj. I tilfælde af, at behovet for at holde så stramme defensive formationer over Europa kompromitterede nøjagtigheden af ​​Norden bombesight, da individuelle bombeløb ikke var mulige uden at bryde formationen. Hele bombeformationer måtte slippe deres byrder på den ledende bombardørs kommando, og de uundgåelige små forskelle i timing og kurs førte til spredte bombemønstre.

Den endelige version af B-17 var G-modellen, der kom i drift i sommeren 1943. Bevæbnet med ikke mindre end 13 0,50 kaliber maskingeværer, heraf to i et nyt "hage" tårn til forsvar mod frontalt angreb , B-17G temmelig bustet med maskingeværer. Det blev betjent af et besætning på 10, herunder piloten, copiloten, navigatør-radiomanden, bombardøren og kanonerne. Flyets serviceloft på 25.000 til 35.000 fod (7.500 til 10.500 meter), afhængigt af bombelasten, satte det over det værste af det tyske luftfartøjsartilleri, men trods ildkraft viste formationer af B-17'er sig ude af stand til at kæmpe sig uden eskorterede. til mål dybt inde i Tyskland i lyset af målrettet krigeropposition uden at pådrage store tab. Dybe razziaer blev afblæst i midten af ​​oktober 1943 og blev ikke genoptaget før i februar 1944, da langtrækkende eskortejagere som P-51 Mustang blev tilgængelige. En bombelast på 1.800 kg var typisk for lange missioner, selvom B-17 internt kunne bære op til 3.600 kg internt i kortere afstande i lavere højder og endnu mere på eksterne stativer under vingerne. Disse øgede bombelastninger blev brugt til god effekt i angreb på den tyske fly- og olieindustri før Normandie-invasionen i juni 1944 og i "tæppebombning" -angreb, der understøttede de allieredes udbrud til Britanny og Nordfrankrig senere samme sommer.

Boeing delte produktionen med Douglas-, Lockheed- og Vega-virksomhederne og havde tilsyn med fremstillingen af ​​omkring 12.730 flyvende fæstninger, næsten alle engagerede sig i bombninger i stor højde over Europa. Selvom B-24 Liberator blev produceret i mindre antal end sin partner, var B-17 med overlegne højhøjdepræstationer og større modstand mod slagskader grundpilleren i den strategiske bombekampagne. B-17 havde fremragende flyveegenskaber og var, i modsætning til B-24, næsten universelt godt anset af dem, der fløj den. B-17 blev forældet af den større og mere kraftfulde B-29 Superfortress og tjente efter krigen i små mængder som et søge-og-redningsfly modificeret til at tabe redningsflåder med faldskærm.


Baggrund

Under kommando af kontreadmiral Monzo Akiyama bestod japanske tropper i Marshalls af den 6. basestyrke, der oprindeligt talte omkring 8.100 mand og 110 fly. Mens han var en relativt stor styrke, blev Akiyamas styrke fortyndet af kravet om at sprede sin kommando over alle Marshallerne. Meget af Akiyamas kommando omfattede også arbejds-/konstruktionsdetaljer eller søtropper med lidt infanteriuddannelse. Som et resultat kunne Akiyama kun mønstre omkring 4.000 effektive. Forventet at angrebet først ville ramme en af ​​de yderliggende øer, placerede han størstedelen af ​​sine mænd på Jaluit, Millie, Maloelap og Wotje.

Amerikanske planer

I november 1943 begyndte amerikanske luftangreb at eliminere Akiyamas luftmagt og ødelægge 71 fly. Disse blev delvist erstattet af forstærkninger indbragt fra Truk i de følgende uger. På den allierede side planlagde admiral Chester Nimitz oprindeligt en række angreb på Marshalls ydre øer, men efter at have modtaget besked om japanske troppestillinger gennem ULTRA radioaflytninger valgt at ændre hans tilgang.

I stedet for at angribe, hvor Akiyamas forsvar var stærkest, beordrede Nimitz sine styrker til at bevæge sig mod Kwajalein Atoll i det centrale Marshalls. Angreb den 31. januar 1944 landede kontreadmiral Richmond K. Turners 5. amfibiekræfter elementer af generalmajor Holland M. Smiths V Amfibiekorps på de øer, der dannede atollen. Med støtte fra kontreadmiral Marc A. Mitschers transportører sikrede amerikanske styrker Kwajalein på fire dage.

Skift af tidslinje

Med den hurtige fangst af Kwajalein fløj Nimitz ud fra Pearl Harbor for at mødes med sine chefer. De resulterende diskussioner førte til beslutningen om straks at flytte mod Eniwetok Atoll, 330 miles mod nordvest. Oprindeligt planlagt til maj blev invasionen af ​​Eniwetok tildelt brigadegeneral Thomas E. Watsons kommando, der var centreret om de 22. marinesoldater og 106. infanteriregiment. Avanceret til midten af ​​februar krævede planer om at fange atollen landinger på tre af dens øer: Engebi, Eniwetok og Parry.


Wheels West Day i Susanville History – 17. februar 1943

Chester Van Etten -familien på otte er gået alt for at tjene onkel Sam.

Fru Van Etten er elektrikerhjælper på Maxwell Field i Sacramento, hendes mand, Chester Van Etten, meldte sig til flåden og er nu stationeret i Virginia, en søn, Billy Ramser, enlistee fra hærens luftkorps, Arcadia, Californien, har netop afsluttede sin soloflyvning, en anden søn, James Ramser, i flåden, er nu i Ames, Iowa, og en tredje søn, OW Ramser, navy, har set handling i Pearl Harbor.

En datter, fru Willa McDow og en svigerdatter, Donna Ramser, udfører gejstligt arbejde på Maxwell Field, Sacramento, mens en anden svigerdatter, Joyce Ramser, er ansat i forsvarsarbejde i Herlong.

Kadetter hjælper med fund drive

En af de mest generøse og spontane bevægelser ved at give penge i Lassen amt siden krigens begyndelse, fulgte et brev fra regionskontoret, hvor han anmodede om et bidrag på 10 cent fra hver cadet fra civil aeronautics war training school i Susanville til Infantil Lammelsesfond.

Ifølge bosiddende søofficer Lieut. F. O. Reed, da han afgav meddelelsen til drengene og bad om en mulig donation på 25 cent, hvis de følte sig i stand til det, resulterede øjeblikkelig og entusiastisk budgivning. Drengene hævede hvert bud for at overgå hinanden i deres bidrag. Inden for en time blev summen på over $ 500 hævet, et beløb på mere end $ 6,50 pr. Kadet. To af kadetterne var kendt for at have bidraget med $ 25 hver.

Ifølge betjentene på skolen er kadetternes ånd endnu mere bemærkelsesværdig, når man tager i betragtning, at deres måneds løn udgør $ 75.


GENNEM krigen blev der skelnet mellem individuel træning på den ene side og mandskabs- og enhedstræning på den anden. De tidligere forberedte eleverne i deres individuelle specialer, såsom pilot, navigator eller skytte, sidstnævnte lærte disse personer at arbejde effektivt som et team. Efter juli 1940 var individuel uddannelse af flyvende personale hovedsageligt funktionen af ​​de tre Air Corps træningscentre, der opererede under ledelse af Office of the Chief of the Air Corps. I februar 1942 blev denne funktion delegeret til en enkelt Flying Training Command, som man husker i 1943 blev fusioneret med Technical Training Command for at danne Training Command med hovedkvarter i Fort Worth, Texas. Kampmandskab og enhedstræning blev udført fra begyndelsen af ​​1941 af de fire kontinentale luftstyrkers træning af fragt- og færgehold blev udført af lufttransportkommandoen.

Pre-flyvende træning

Som det havde været tilfældet i første verdenskrig, da grundskoler for luftkadetter var blevet etableret på udvalgte gymnasier i hele landet, blev det nødvendigt at sørge for potentielle piloter, bombardører og navigatører omfattende præflyvningsinstruktioner forud for deres opgave til flyveskoler . I intervallet mellem de to krige havde dette ikke været nødvendigt. Den lille luftfartsvirksomhed i fredstid tillod fastsættelse af høje uddannelseskrav til valg af kadetter, og der blev givet tilstrækkelig tid til militær indoktrinering i flyveskolerne. Den hurtige ekspansion, der begyndte i 1939, bød imidlertid på særlige problemer med militær træning

for potentielle officerer-ledere af kampbesætninger og den tidlige nødvendighed af at sænke uddannelsesstandarderne for optagelse på kadetprogrammer tvang opmærksomhed til midler, hvorved et minimum af akademisk forberedelse kunne sikres. Forflugtsskolen gav en løsning på dette tosidede problem. 1

I februar 1941 autoriserede krigsafdelingen oprettelse af tre Air Corps udskiftningsuddannelsescentre til klassificering og forhåndsvisning af kandidater til pilot-, bombardier- og navigatortræning. Den officielle betegnelse for "præflyvningsskole" blev godkendt den 30. april 1942, og udtrykket erstatningsuddannelsescenter blev droppet. På det tidspunkt var preflight -skoler i drift på Maxwell Field, Alabama Kelly og Ellington Fields, Texas og Santa Ana Army Air Base, Californien. Skolen på Kelly Field blev kort efter flyttet til et tilstødende sted, der blev udpeget til San Antonio Aviation Cadet Center.

Der var forskellige meninger om, hvorvidt pilot- og nonpilot -kandidater skulle tildeles den samme preflight -skole. Først var alle praktikanter inkluderet i den samme organisation, men kort efter blev der skabt separate skoler. Den generelle regel om separat, omend lignende uddannelse, blev fulgt indtil april 1944. På det tidspunkt krævede den nedadgående tendens i antallet af elever konsolidering, og Uddannelseskommandoen instruerede, at pilot- og bombardier-navigatørskoler skulle kombineres. Studerende kom derefter ind på preflight -skoler med kun en generel flybesætningsklassifikation og blev først tildelt en specialitet nær ved slutningen af ​​preflight -forløbet. Da krigen flyttede til et klimaks, viste den samlede skole sig mere tilpasningsdygtig til de skiftende krav til hver type flypersonale. I november 1944, da strømmen af ​​studerende var reduceret til en sild, blev al træning konsolideret i en preflight -skole i San Antonio Aviation Cadet Center. 2

Selvom der eksisterede enighed om behovet for en form for præ-flyvende uddannelse, var ideer om kursets indhold vage, da skolerne først åbnede. Ved meddelelsen af ​​beslutningen om at foretage en sådan instruktion udtalte OCAC, at preflight -perioden ville bestå af "fysisk træning, militær træning, tilsynet atletik og fuldstændig behandling af tildelte studerende" samt "yderligere" undervisning og træning, som det kan lade sig gøre. . . to further qualify trainees for instruction as pilots, bombardiers, or navigators." 3 Brig. Gen. Walter R. Weaver, commanding the Southeast Air Corps

Training Center, leaned toward military discipline and physical conditioning as the primary aims of preflight, and his view was supported by many officers who viewed the academic program as sub-ordinate. Curricular development, however, followed the direction favored by those who stressed the need for technical knowledge on the part of aircrew members. There was a steady increase in the relative amount of time and recognition given to academic subjects, and this phase of the program became the paramount function of the preflight schools. Military training doubtless suffered from this trend, but the development was a logical response to the increasingly technical nature of air combat. 4

Four weeks was the standard length of training at the replacement training centers until March 1942, when a nine-week course was instituted. Separate curricula were issued at that time for pilot and nonpilot training the distinguishing feature of the latter curriculum was greater emphasis upon mathematics, target identification, photography, and meteorology. Until 1943 each preflight school exercised broad discretion in executing the prescribed program. The lack of uniform instruction proved a handicap in subsequent stages of aircrew training, and to correct this situation a single curriculum for all preflight students was published in April 1943. Final developments of the course were incorporated in a revision of May 1944, when the period of training was extended to ten weeks. 5

Under the various preflight curricula, students spent four to five hours daily in academic training. Many students entering preflight were so deficient in the fundamentals of mathematics and physics that considerable time had to be given to rudimentary drills, with emphasis upon problems related to performance of flying duties. Theory was reduced to a minimum, and matter inapplicable to aviation was progressively screened out of the courses. Since ability to use aeronautical maps and charts was basic to flying operations, an elementary course in that subject was also developed in the preflight schools. The course became increasingly practical as the necessary materials were made available for teaching purposes a large portion of the allotted hours was reserved for student exercises in simulated operational problems which required use of aeronautical charts. 6

The subject of aircraft and naval vessel recognition slowly gained acceptance in recognition of its combat importance. Early teaching of planes and ships was largely ineffectual because too much was

attempted with too little time and equipment, but by 1943 the pre-flight recognition program was fairly satisfactory. The time allotted to the course was extended, and the number of visual aids greatly increased. During 1994 and 1945, with an adequate supply of projectors, slides, and screens, the schools were quite successful in training students to recognize, almost instantly, close-up views of the principal American and British aircraft. The scope of naval vessel recognition was gradually restricted to identification of ships by general type, including merchantmen and landing craft, rather than by nationality or individual class. 7

Pilot trainees, in particular, were unhappy in having to take radio code instruction. It was admittedly a dull subject, requiring concentration and repetition. Student motivation was weakened by the fact that flyers returned from combat generally declared that overseas they had little use for code. Headquarters, AAF, however, repeatedly directed that code be taught, and all preflight students, except those who demonstrated proficiency, had to attend one hour of code daily. By 1944 both sending and receiving of code, by aural and visual means, were taught. The proficiency required was six words per minute. 8

Of the 175 hours of instruction called for in the official academic program of 1944, 110 were allotted to basic military and officer training. One-half of this time was set aside for close order drill, ceremonies, and inspections the remainder went to classroom or squadron instruction in customs and courtesies of the service, chemical warfare defense, small-arms familiarization, and related military subjects. The West Point code of cadet discipline and honor was regarded as the model for the preflight schools. The traditional class system, with its more or less stereotyped forms of hazing, was introduced at first, but this practice came under severe public attack, and in spite of its defense by the responsible military authorities, the class system was abolished by order of the Flying Training Command in May 1943. 9 While there may have been disciplinary advantages in the supervision of each lower class by upperclassmen, the hazing associated with the system interfered with the primary mission of the schools and was ill suited to the temperament of the civilian soldier.

Physical conditioning was one of the major purposes of preflight, and after initial uncertainty regarding the nature of such training, a comprehensive and balanced program was evolved. Experimentation

was the rule during the early period, when calisthenics, in varying amounts, were mixed with competitive sports, cross-country hikes, and obstacle courses. In September 1943 a weekly minimum of six hours of physical training was established for all aviation cadets. The trend toward uniform conditioning culminated in November 1949 when the Training Command published a detailed outline of exercises for each stage of aircrew training. This memorandum provided for a steady progression of physical hardening and a specified division of time among standard drills, team games, and aquatic exercises. 10

The chief problem in developing an effective preflight program was the lack of qualified academic instructors. Because few military personnel were available and they were inadequately prepared as teachers, it was realized that they could not be depended upon exclusively, and in July 1941 authority was granted to hire civilians. Within a year it was recognized that professional training and educational experience were prime requisites of academic instructors, and such men were procured in large numbers. Although these civilians were generally satisfactory, their status as civilians proved troublesome. They were authorized to wear military-type uniforms, but such quasi-military status did not make them feel at home in Army schools. Some of the men, furthermore, were in the process of being drafted by their selective service boards, and others were accepting commissions offered by the Navy. To hold on to these teachers, the AAF in the latter part of 1942 and during 1943 gave direct commissions to civilian instructors at the schools, as well as to several hundred procured directly from colleges, and sent them to the AAF administrative officer training school. Instructors under thirty-five were allowed to enlist and were then assigned to the officer candidate school. Practically all of the men who thus became officers were returned to their preflight teaching positions. In addition, a few instructors who were physically ineligible for commissions remained at the schools as enlisted men, and a small number of civilians were also retained. 11

Although most of the instructors were experienced college or high school teachers, some had almost no knowledge of some of the subjects they were assigned to teach. In order to deal with this problem, practical in-service training, consisting of classroom observations, individual study of textual materials, and conferences with veteran pre-flight teachers, was given at each school. Attention was limited at first to preparing each instructor in the subjects he was required to

teach, but programs to improve teaching techniques and develop familiarization with the entire curriculum were later developed. In the summer of 1943 these local efforts were supplemented by a special course at the central instructors school at Randolph Field. After a considerable number of teachers had attended the six-week program there, the course for ground-school instructors was dropped in January 1944. 12

The typical aviation cadet was an eager learner in preflight school. Ground training in any form was viewed with some misgivings by the average cadet, but he responded willingly to preflight instruction. Pilot and navigator students usually showed the highest morale, because their classification most commonly coincided with their first preference. Many of the bombardier students, up to 1943, were eliminees from pilot training who, required to repeat preflight instruction, naturally resented the delay and repetition of subject matter. In 1943 bombardier morale was greatly improved when it was decided that an eliminee from one type of aircrew training, who had completed preflight, would no longer be required to retake that phase of training. As the war neared its end, the attitude of all students be-came less inspired. Delays in the progress of training, caused by curtailments in the aircrew program, proved especially disheartening. 13

The preflight schools formed an integral part of aircrew training throughout the war. In 1943 an additional phase of pre-flying instruction was introduced: the aircrew college training program, which lasted until July 199.4. The college program, to put it bluntly, came into existence not so much to meet an educational need as to hold a backlog of aircrew candidates. As has been previously noted,* the AAF had found it advisable in 1942 to recruit aviation cadets in excess of its immediate needs and to hold them in an inactive enlisted reserve until needed. By December 1942 approximately 93,000 men were awaiting classification and instruction, and many of them had been in this limbo for six or seven months. Not only did this extended in-active period discourage some of the men, but the pool of idle man-power received increasing notice from selective service boards and the War Manpower Commission. Accordingly, General Arnold proposed to the War Department that these men be called to active duty and given a period of college training designed to make up educational deficiencies.

In January 1943 the Secretary of War, after making certain modifications, ordered Arnold's recommendations into effect. The Services of Supply, then in the process of establishing the Army specialized training program in various colleges, was directed to set up aircrew college training as a separate project. The curriculum was planned to cover a five-month period, and all aircrew candidates were to be assigned from basic training centers to the colleges unless they could pass a special educational test. The relatively few who passed this test were sent directly to preflight schools. 14 Special boards within the Flying Training Command made preliminary selection of colleges for the program, and the contracts for instruction, housing, messing, and medical care were later negotiated by the AAF Materiel Command. Implementation of the project suffered because of the haste in which it was conceived and executed by April 1943 over 60,000 men were in aircrew college training detachments at more than 150 institutions. 15 Since the AAF viewed the college enterprise primarily as a personnel rather than a training activity, it failed to establish a clear definition of its educational purpose. The educational objectives, as stated by the Flying Training Command, varied from a limited "Preparation . . . both mentally and physically, for intensive ground training in the Preflight Schools" to the broader "attempt to diminish individual differences in educational background for subsequent air crew training." 16

Academic subjects, taught by college faculty members, included mathematics, physics, current history, geography, English, and civil air regulations. Military indoctrination, the responsibility of the officers of each detachment, consisted of drill, inspections and ceremonies, guard duty, customs and courtesies, and medical aid. Military training was carried into the academic phase by having the students march to and from classes and by insisting upon proper military courtesies at all times. Although there was a great variance in the degree of emphasis upon discipline at the colleges, this phase of the program was probably more valuable than any other, in that it at least helped adapt students to the standard regimen of Army training. Physical conditioning, required one hour daily, included calisthenics, running, and competitive sports. 17

Perhaps the most controversial phase of the curriculum was the ten hours of flight indoctrination. The AAF did not desire this instruction in the college program it was prescribed by the War Department

and conducted in cooperation with the Civil Aeronautics Administration. Flying schools located near the colleges provided the training under contract. Since the purpose of this flying was only familiarization, operations were restricted to simple maneuvers in light aircraft, under dual control by instructor and student. AAF observers criticized the training as of little value, charging that the students were "merely riding around for 10 hours." A study conducted in 1944 showed that the indoctrination course helped students materially in the regular primary stage of flying training but gave them no appreciable advantage in later stages. Whatever its long-range value, the course was a morale booster for men who had waited months to learn to fly. 18

As early as November 1943 moves were made toward liquidating the college program. By that time sufficient aircrew personnel were in the training pipeline, and the backlog of men on inactive status was relatively small. The Training Command took the view that the college program was not essential and that it was creating an unfavorable public attitude by holding combat-age personnel in colleges while fathers were being drafted into military service. In January 1944 en-trance of aircrew students into college was cut almost in half, and contracts with many institutions were terminated. In March, as a consequence of the general manpower shortage, the AAF was directed to return to the Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces all personnel recruited from those branches who had not reached the preflight stage of aircrew training. This order resulted in large withdrawals of students from the college detachments and sealed the fate of the program. Shortly thereafter, the Secretary of War approved its final liquidation by July 1944 since procurement of aircrew candidates had been suspended, there appeared to be insufficient personnel in the backlog to sustain the program beyond that time. 19

Although the number of enlisted reservists awaiting training had been greatly diminished by the middle of 1944, the general problem of backlogs, or personnel pools, was by no means ended. During the year requests from combat theaters for aircrew personnel declined sharply entry of students into the flying stages of training was accordingly reduced, and this had created pools in intermediate stages of the training sequence. The Training Command concluded that the best solution to the problem was to distribute personnel from the pools to flying fields for on-the-job instruction. AAF Headquarters

accepted the recommendation and authorized the beginning of on-the-line training, with a dual objective: to provide storage and training of delayed students and to alleviate the growing shortage of regularly assigned personnel at the airfields. On-the-line training was first put into effect in February 1944, and after termination of the college program in July, it became the principal holding device for pre-flying personnel pools. 20

Higher headquarters provided little guidance in the development of an instructional program for on-the-line students. The Training Command advised only that "trainees will be given duty assignments with aircraft maintenance and servicing where they will get more practical training for their future instruction." Responsibility for implementing the program was left almost entirely to individual station commanders, and this fact resulted in considerable variation in the training. Some commanders reasoned that the students would shortly be returned to the normal sequence of aircrew instruction and gave them slight attention others saw the possibility of a longer period of delay and devoted a great deal of consideration to their training, work, and recreation.

Some stations offered a few elementary academic courses, but attendance was voluntary a formal thirty-day mechanic course was established at stations of the Western Flying Training Command. At every field, however, student training consisted chiefly of apprentice experience in aircraft maintenance. Because of the increasing shortage of regularly assigned enlisted personnel, permission was eventually granted to use trainees for administrative and nontechnical duties, as well as on the flight line. Such permission tended to draw students ever closer to enlisted and further from cadet status. As progressive cuts in the aircrew program continued, large numbers of aircrew candidates were transferred to regular enlisted status and classified in their appropriate military occupational specialties. 21

In no other stage of aircrew training was the problem of morale so serious as in on-the-line training. Lack of an explicit program was partially responsible, but delay and uncertainty concerning the students' future were of primary importance. Each step in curtailing the aircrew program was an added blow to morale. Although many of the trainees eventually reached flying schools, large numbers remained in the pools by the end of 1944 some men had been in pre-aircrew status for almost a year. Higher headquarters showed concern over

the attitude of such students and explained each curtailment of air-crew training quotas as the result of unexpected combat success. To young and ambitious men this explanation was hardly satisfying as they moved toward enlisted status, many experienced bitter disappointment and sense of failure. 22

Pilot Training

Although the importance of other specialties was increasingly recognized during the war, the pilot remained the principal object of Air Corps training. While each member of the aircrew was essential to performance of assigned missions, the general success and safety of the crew depended mainly upon the pilot, who was the aircraft commander. Although the AAF made a substantially successful effort to give all flying personnel due recognition, it properly put flying training in top priority.

Development of a military pilot required a succession of training stages, for it was not feasible to train a man to fly a powerful combat or service airplane without preparation in simpler and less specialized aircraft. During the 1920's and 1930's pilots had received a total of twelve months' instruction, divided into three stages. After 1931 the primary and basic stages were given in an eight-month combined course at Randolph Field, Texas a four-month advanced course, providing specialization in bombardment, pursuit, observation, or attack aviation, was taught at Kelly Field, Texas. This peacetime system of training was successful in producing a small number of graduates who were both skillful pilots and highly qualified junior officers. 23

In July 1939 the total instructional time was reduced from twelve to nine months. In the following May, with the war pressure mounting across the Atlantic, the period was cut to seven months. Although the introduction of preflight training in the following year compensated somewhat for the loss of time allotted to flying schools, the seven-month period, which allowed only ten weeks each for primary, basic, and advanced flying, was considered insufficient by existing standards. But national danger required unprecedented steps, and shortly after Pearl Harbor the time for each stage was forced down to nine weeks. In March 1944 each stage was lengthened to ten weeks, and after V-J Day to fifteen weeks. The post-hostilities schedule raised the time for individual pilot training to a level approximately that of the 1930's. 24

The three stages--primary, basic, and advanced--were common to the training of all Air Corps pilots, and upon graduation from advanced, students received their wings and bars. This step, however, did not signify the end of their training the new pilots were given additional periods of specialized instruction suited to their military assignments. Such instruction included in all cases a period of transition flying.

The term "transition" was applied generally to a pilot's learning to operate an unfamiliar plane thus all students underwent several brief transition phases as they progressed through the normal stages of pilot training. In primary they learned to fly a small aircraft of low horsepower in basic they transitioned to a heavier plane with more complex controls in advanced they learned to fly a still more powerful machine which approximated the characteristics of combat aircraft. Transition to combat planes, which generally did not occur until after a pilot had earned his wings, was a larger undertaking than previous transitions to training planes. It involved not only learning to fly a complex, high-performance aircraft, but also the acquisition of flying techniques, preliminary to operational unit training. In order to make adequate provision for this step, a special stage, called transition, was evolved in the major pilot programs.

When the Air Corps' expansion began in 1939, transition to combat aircraft was a function of the GHQ Air Force and units in overseas departments the four continental air forces took over this job and carried it on until 1942. By that time the program had become too large for the air forces alone to direct in addition to their operational unit training. Consequently, transition of pilots to heavy and medium bombardment aircraft was assigned to the Flying Training Command, the agency primarily responsible for individual flying instruction. Light bombardment and fighter transition, however, remained a function of the continental air forces' operational units. 25

The time allotted to pilot transition to combat planes varied throughout the war, but by May 1944 it was stabilized at ten weeks for bombardment transition. Fighter pilots received five weeks of transition on obsolescent combat types before being assigned to operational units, where they were given transition on current fighter types prior to tactical training. Transition to the specific aircraft to be flown in combat was the last stage of a pilot's individual training. Upon completion of this stage, he was ready to start training as a

member of an aircrew and a combat unit. Crew and unit indoctrination normally required about twelve weeks, after which the aerial teams were sent to staging areas to prepare for movement overseas. Even though the time for primary-basic-advanced training of pilots was reduced during the war to seven months or less, a pilot was not ready for combat until a year or more after he started flying instruction. 26

Until July 1939 primary training, as well as other phases of pilot training, had been conducted exclusively at Air Corps stations by military instructors. Thereafter, as described above,* the Air Corps depended increasingly upon civilian schools working under contract to provide primary instruction to air cadets by May 1943 there were fifty-six contract primary schools in operation. At each school the AAF maintained a small military contingent whose services were gradually expanded, but the military element in the activity of these schools was subordinated to the task of learning to fly. 27 The termination of contracts began with the curtailment of pilot training in

1944, and by the end of the war the responsibility for primary training had been returned to regular AAF establishments. 28

The instruction given at the contract schools was an adaptation of the primary phase formerly taught at Randolph Field. Although the number of weeks allotted to primary training was sharply reduced, the number of flying hours remained almost constant after the original requirement of sixty-five hours had been trimmed to sixty in March 1942. In that year an unsuccessful attempt was made to add instrument, night, and navigation instruction to the curriculum, but otherwise the program remained virtually the same during the war. As given at the height of the effort, primary flying training was divided into four standard phases. In the pre-solo phase students became familiar with the general operation of a light aircraft and achieved proficiency in forced landing techniques and in recovering from stalls and spins. In the second, or intermediate phase, pre-solo work was reviewed, and precision of control was developed by flying standard courses or patterns, known as elementary 8's, lazy 8's, pylon 8's, and chandelles. The third, or accuracy, phase demanded high proficiency in various types of landing approaches and landings the fourth, or acrobatic, phase required ability to perform loops, Immelmann turns, slow rolls, half-rolls, and snap rolls. The ratio of dual to solo hours was flexible within the limitation that a minimum of 40 per cent and a maximum of 50 per cent of the total time was to be dual. Each student in primary was required to make at least 175 landings. 29

It was the mission of the basic schools to make military pilots out of primary graduates hence, these schools were completely controlled and operated by the military. Although basic flying was conducted by a few private contractors, on a trial basis, from 1941 to 1943 and the experiment met with some success, AAF officials questioned the ability of civilians to teach military flying techniques, and by the end of 1943 curtailment of the pilot program removed any necessity for using private agencies in basic training. The student at basic learned to operate a plane of greater weight, power, and complexity than the plane which he had mastered in primary. In addition, the student was introduced to new aspects of airmanship, learning to fly by instruments, at night, in formation, and cross-country. The military instructors emphasized precision and smoothness of airplane operation, and a large portion of flying time was devoted to repetition of maneuvers to develop proficiency. 30

After 1939 the basic stage was accomplished in from 70 to 75 hours of flying, as compared with the loo hours required before that time. It was divided into a transition phase, involving familiarization with the plane and fundamental operations, and a diversified phase, which included accuracy maneuvers and acrobatics, and formation, instrument, navigation, and night flying. Reduction in training time was at first effected by eliminating navigation and formation flights and decreasing slightly the hours allotted to other portions of the diversified phase. In 1940 formation and day navigation flights were restored to the curriculum, and Link trainer instruction was added. Soon after Pearl Harbor, in response to observed combat requirements, increasing emphasis was placed upon the diversified phase, but the change was unsatisfactory, because it allowed too little time for fundamental transition exercises. The root of the difficulty lay in the fact that the nine weeks given to basic from 1942 to 1944 were not enough to permit satisfactory development of proficiency in both phases of training. Since it was impracticable to accomplish the full objective, there was a serious controversy over which phase should receive principal emphasis. During 1943 the curriculum was modified to favor transition at the expense of diversified training and, as might have been expected, graduates showed greater proficiency in the so-called flying fundamentals but were weak in formation and instrument flying. Criticisms of this weakness from combat units brought a change in basic curricular requirements in May 1944, at which time the length of training was extended to ten weeks. Although the hours allotted to flying were held constant, there was a shift of hours within the diversified phase, instrument time being increased at the expense of acrobatics. 31

Instrument training was doubtless the most important part of the basic curriculum. Experience in combat underlined the necessity of flying at night and under all weather conditions, and such missions required operation of aircraft by instruments. The nature and extent of the instrument indoctrination given to pilots at basic schools were insufficient until late in 1943, partly because of the traditional peace-time attitude of training officers who subordinated instrument work to conventional visual maneuvers. Another reason for this deficiency was the acute shortage of instructional time and equipment more-over, the system of instrument flying used by the AAF before June 1943 was not the most efficient. The AAF system relied almost exclusively

upon the three rate instruments: the needle, or rate-of-turn indicator the ball, or bank indicator and the airspeed indicator. Gyroscopic instruments were practically ignored. During 1942 the Navy developed an improved method of instrument flying, the full-panel system, which relied chiefly upon the directional gyroscope and the artificial horizon. AAF instructors who observed the new method found it to be more accurate than the traditional one hence, the full-panel system was introduced at basic and advanced pilot schools in June 1943. Assistance in establishing the new system was given by officers from the central instructors school (instrument pilot), which had been activated in March 1943 as a means of strengthening the AAF instrument program. During the succeeding year a substantial improvement in the instrument proficiency of basic graduates was achieved this resulted from standardized employment of the more efficient system, proper training of instructors, procurement of adequate equipment, and allocation of more flying hours to instrument work. 32

The traditional basic curriculum had always been confined to training on single-engine aircraft differentiation of students for single-engine or two-engine instruction did not normally occur until advanced training. But during 1943 and 1944 an attempt was made, in the interest of improving the proficiency of multiengine pilots, to begin two-engine training for them in basic. Although the majority of students continued to receive the standard single-engine curriculum, small numbers were entered into one of two experimental curricula. The first of these was a combination course after transitioning on the single-engine basic trainer, the student received familiarization instruction on a two-engine plane. The second course was conducted exclusively with two-engine aircraft. Although the experimental curricula showed some promise, they were abandoned in 1945 The combination course allowed too little time for the student to gain more than familiarization with either type of plane the second course proved impracticable because of the shortage of appropriate two-engine aircraft. The experiment indicated, however, that if adequate numbers of satisfactory trainers were planned for and provided, differentiation of instruction at the basic stage would prove more efficient than the conventional curriculum. 33

Although twin-engine training did not become a permanent part of the basic curriculum, one of the responsibilities of the basic schools

was the selection of students for single- or two-engine advanced training. Assignment was based upon a combination of factors--current requirements for fighter and multiengine pilots, the student's aptitude, his physical measurements, and preference. After the middle of 1944, however, student choice was generally disregarded. Preferences for fighter training exceeded the demand, and there were not enough men with the requisite physical qualifications who desired bombardment. Some schools found it necessary to assign all men with the required physique to advanced two-engine schools.

The differentiation of single-engine from two-engine training in the advanced stage was not effected until the spring of 1942 although planning for the change dated back to October 1940. 34 As it had evolved by 1944, the single-engine curriculum consisted of seventy hours of flying instruction, compared with seventy-five hours in 1939. It included five phases--transition, instrument, navigation, formation, and acrobatics Link trainer time was also required. Instrument operation was a continuation of the methods learned in basic the transition, navigation, and formation phases all required night flights. In response to the lessons of war, increasing emphasis was placed on formation flying, especially at high altitudes and using the close, three-plane V-formation. Acrobatics included all conventional combat maneuvers within the performance limits of the advanced trainer. 35 Although some of the graduates of the advanced single-engine school eventually were assigned as noncombat pilots or were sent to bombardment operational training units for service as co-pilots, the principal mission of the school was to prepare students for subsequent flying in fighter aircraft. To achieve this end, the advanced schools stressed the handling of maneuverable, speedy training planes and the development of instantaneous control reactions in students.

But besides expert flying ability, the fighter pilot needed skill in fixed aerial gunnery. Hence, during the course of advanced training the more promising students, those who were to become combat fighter pilots, were assigned to a fighter-transition and gunnery stage. This preparation for operational unit training consisted of some twenty hours of fixed gunnery practice in the standard advanced training plane and about ten hours of transition in an obsolescent combat type (P-40 or P-39). Development of proper techniques and equipment for fixed gunnery training came slowly, although gradual improvement was noted after 1942 when better teaching methods and use of


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Kommentarer:

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